This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show that a positive cross-licensing royalty rate, which would otherwise relax competition and sustain a collusive outcome, dulls incentives to litigate against entrants. Our analysis can shed light on the puzzling practice of royalty free cross-licensing arrangements between competing firms in the same industry as such arrangements enhance incentives to litigate against any potential entrants and can be used as entry-deterrence mechanism.
Introduction
This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. It is increasingly common in today's high-tech industries that commercialization of new products requires applications of multiple technologies. In addition, these technologies are often proprietary and patented by different patent owners.
As a result, firms often need to engage in cross-licensing arrangements to successfully market the products without infringing other firms' intellectual property (IP) rights. In such a case, it is a well-known result that cross-licensing firms have incentives to sustain a collusive outcome by including a positive royalty rate to soften competition in the product market (Shapiro, 1985 ; Jeon and Lefouili, forthcoming). By contrast, we consider probabilistic IP and show that a positive cross-licensing royalty rate dulls incentives to litigate against entrants as litigation entails the risk of IP being invalidated. We find that the optimal crosslicensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation.
To illustrate the mechanism, we analyze a set-up in which two incumbent firms, A and B, compete in a common market (market C), but they also have their own respective captive markets (market A and market B, respectively). This type of situation can arise when the patented technologies can be applied to several different categories of products or markets. For example, consider the royalty-free cross-licensing arrangement between Pfizer and Medarex who develop their own separate anti-CTLA-4 products, which are a completely novel compound to battle cancer. As both firms own or control patents and patent applications relating antibody products that target CTLA-4, each firm could block the development and availability of antibody products that are directed against CTLA-4. 1 At the time of the cross-licensing agreement, both firms had their own separate markets.
For instance, Medarex had a presence in other product markets based on its UltiMab human antibody technology, such inflammatory diseases, immune system diseases and infectious diseases. The license agreement also stipulated that each company enforces its own patents 1 See the SEC filing entitled "Cross-license agreement b/w Pfizer Overseas Pharmaceutical and Medarex, Inc.", available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/874255/ 000119312504188088/dex993.htm. against infringing activities by third parties and reports if any of its included IP is deemed invalid.
In the benchmark case of no potential entrant, we first establish that the optimal crosslicensing contract is characterized by a positive royalty rate to sustain a collusive outcome.
We then consider a situation in which there is a potential entrant that can enter one of the two captive markets. This is to abstract from a potential free rider problem in entry deterrence when the entry is into a common market, which is addressed later. We show that a positive royalty rate dulls litigation incentives of the incumbent facing entry in its captive market. The reason is that a potentially negative litigation outcome for the incumbent would invalidate its IP and put it at a disadvantageous position against the other rival incumbent in the common market: it needs to continue to pay a positive royalty rate to the rival firm whereas the rival firm now is able to use its invalidated IP without paying a positive royalty rate. As a result, we may have a situation in which the incumbent may not have a credible threat against an entrant if the cross-licensing royalty rate is set at the level to sustain collusion. In that case, the incumbent may prefer to set the royalty rate at a lower level to maintain incentives to litigate and restore the credibility of litigation threats against the potential entrant.
Our analysis also reveals that incumbent IP holders facing potential entry may actually benefit from an exogenous increase in litigation expenses. This result is in contrast to cases where the patent holder is a non-practicing entity, or both the IP holder and the alleged infringer are already operating in the market. In such cases, higher litigation costs hurt the patent holder as litigation incentives are mitigated. By contrast, in our framework, an increase in exogenous litigation costs may benefit the incumbents by changing the equilibrium configuration from entry met with litigation to entry deterrence.
We also discuss patent pools as possible way to achieve full collusion in the product market while maintaining the credibility of the litigation threat against potential entrants.
As opposed to Lerner and Tirole (2004) and most of the patent pool literature, we consider vertically integrated firm who are potential licensees of a pooling arrangement. We show that requiring pool members to independently license their patents outside the pools can prevent the formation of welfare-reducing pools and make patent pools and cross-licensing equivalent.
Finally, we consider optimal cross-licensing between incumbents when there is potential entry in their common market. In this case, infringement litigation becomes a free-rider problem. One successful lawsuit prevents entry and preserves both incumbents' market power. However, litigation implies the risk of having the patent invalidated which would put the firm in a disadvantaged position in the marketplace, as in the benchmark case of the captive market entry. The higher the cross-license fee the incumbents set, the higher the potential loss from an invalidated patent and the larger the free rider problem. The incumbents thus face a trade-off between collusive cross-licensing and maintaining a credible litigation threat by alleviating the free rider problem with low cross-license fees. Again we show that the incumbents optimally set their cross-license fees below the collusive level. If the incumbents' patents are weak, the optimal cross-license is low and deters entry completely. With stronger patents, the optimal license fee is higher and induces entry which is followed by potential infringement litigation. At the same time they are also cognizant of the potential anti-competitive effects of crosslicensing as an instrument of collusion and entry deterrence. For the latter it is necessary that (1) the excluded firm cannot compete effectively without the licensed technology and (2) the cross-licensing firms collectively possess market power in the relevant market (DOJ/FTC 2017, p. 31). The European Commission follows a similar rule of reason approach and cautions that "license agreements that reduce intra-technology competition may facilitate collusion or reduce inter-technology competition by raising barriers to entry" (EC 2014, para 173). We present a unified theory to capture both of these two concerns and shed light on their interaction. In particular, our analysis implies that restraining the use of positive royalty cross-licensing rates to curb collusive outcomes may have adverse effects on entry of new competitors.
There is a small literature on cross-licensing. 2 However, the focus of the existing literature is very different from ours. Fershtman and Kamien (1992) , for instance, consider the case where the introduction of a new product requires the development of two distinct complementary technologies as in our paper. Their focus is on the interdependence between the innovation race and the cross licensing game. In particular, they analyze how the possibility of cross-licensing affects the pace of the innovation race and how the potential continuation of the innovation race affects the terms of cross licensing contracts. In contrast, we take the development of complementary technologies with dispersed ownership as given, and analyze implications of cross-licensing for competition in the product market.
Jeon and Lefouili (forthcoming) analyze the competitive effects of cross-licensing arrangements as in our paper. They generalize the standard result on the collusive effects of a positive royalty rate (Shapiro, 1985) to a setting with more than two firms. 3 The extension from duopoly to more than two firms is straightforward with a multilateral bargaining involving all of them. Their contribution is to show that bilateral cross-licensing agreements can lead to the monopoly outcome in a setting with many competing firms. However, their analysis assumes iron-clad patents owned by all incumbent firms. In contrast, we consider probabilistic patent rights and the threat of potential entry. In our framework, the incumbents need to balance the benefits of collusion against maintaining incentives to litigate against an entrant to protect the market.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we set up a simple model of patent cross-licensing between two incumbent firms facing a potential entrant. In section 3, we provide a comparative statics analysis with respect to litigation costs to explore implications of escalating litigation costs on entry dynamics. In section 4, we extend the analysis to the case where the entrant's cost is unknown and show that royalty-free licensing contracts can naturally arise in such a situation. Section 5 discusses 2 In contrast, the literature on licensing in general is far more extensive. For an excellent survey on licensing, see Kamien (1992) . 3 Eswaran (1994) also explores how cross-licensing arrangements can be used as a facilitating device.
However, his mechanism is very different as he considers cross-licensing between substitute patents rather than complementary ones. In addition, he adopts a repeated game framework which generates the usual "topsy-turvy" results.
implications of our analysis for patent pools which can be an alternative to cross-licensing arrangements. In section 6, we consider the possibility of entry into the common market and the ensuing free-rider problem. Section 7 closes the paper with concluding remarks.
Model
Consider two incumbent firms, A and B, who are monopolist in a captive market (market A and market B, respectively) and compete in a common market (market C). Demand in the common market is given by D(p) while the size of the captive market for each firm is sD(p).
The parameter s ≥ 0 represents the relative size and importance of the captive market for each firm compared to the common market C in which they compete. As s increases, the relative importance of the captive market increases vis-a-vis the competitive market. For instance, if s = 0, there is no captive market and they are direct competitors. If s is very large, the overlap in their product markets is negligible and the firms essentially operate in different markets. 
Assumption 1(i) states that the symmetric equilibrium profits and outputs are lower as both firms' marginal costs are increased by the same amount. Assumption 1(ii) states that when a firm's marginal cost is unilaterally increased while the rival firm's marginal cost stays the same, its equilibrium profit and output decreases whereas they increase if the rival firm's marginal cost is increased while its cost stays the same.
We consider a situation in which there is a potential entrant that can enter one of the captive markets protected by IP. There is uncertainty about the entrant's capability that will determine which market the entrant will enter. Ex ante, entry is equally likely for each captive market. The assumption of entry to only one captive market is for expositional simplicity. We can easily incorporate entry to both captive markets in a straightforward manner without any changes in the qualitative results. In section 6, we also entertain the possibility of entry to the common market. We assume that there is a fixed cost of entry K ≥ 0. Once the entrant is established in the captive market, it competes with the incumbent using a technology that involves a marginal cost of production of γ ≥ 0.
Following entry in captive market i ∈ {A, B}, incumbent firm i can decide whether to litigate the entrant for the infringement of its IP. We assume that the patent rights of the incumbents are probabilistic in the sense that they can be invalidated in court. This means that in case of litigation, the entrant contests the validity of the patent in question. Let θ be the probability that the court will uphold the validity of the patent. This parameter reflects the strength of the incumbents' patent portfolios. By contrast, if the patent is invalidated, the rival incumbent and the entrant can practice the covered technology at no further cost.
Additionally, we denote L as the exogenous litigation costs for both the incumbent and the entrant. Section 3 explicitly introduces these litigation costs to explore their implications for the entrant's incentives to enter and the incumbents' incentives to deter entry. However, as the main focus of the paper is on the endogenous cost of litigation via cross-licensing, we will abstract from exogenous litigation costs (i.e. L = 0) in other parts of the analysis.
The model set-up is summarized in Figure 1 below. We consider the following timing of the game:
Market
1. Incumbents A and B agree on a per-unit cross-licensing royalty rate r for the common market.
2. Nature picks a captive market for entry. The entrant decides whether to sink a fixed cost K to enter the captive market or not. i's patent is found to be invalid, the captive market with entry remains duopolistic.
In addition, firm i loses its royalty revenue from firm j( = i) in the common market while firm i continues to pay the royalty rate of r to firm j.
In what follows we first consider cross-licensing in the absence of a threat of entry as a benchmark. This is followed by an analysis of the case where the entrant's cost γ is known to the incumbents.
Benchmark Case: No Potential Entrant
As a benchmark case, we first consider a situation in which there is no threat of entry for any of the markets served by firms A and B. In this case there is no linkage between the captive markets and the common market. Each incumbent makes a profit of sπ m (c) in its captive market. Given a cross-licensing royalty rate of r for outputs in the common market C, each firm's equilibrium profit in this market is given by
The first term is the profit from selling the product in market C, the second term are the royalty revenues due to the sales of the rival incumbent. The optimal royalty rate in the absence of potential entrants (r m ) aims to sustain a full collusive outcome in the competitive common market
and we get the following result.
Lemma 1. In the absence of potential entry, the optimal cross-license fee is r m > 0, which induces the fully collusive outcome in the common market.
Proof. Note that
by the envelope theorem. As a result, we have
by Assumption 1(ii). This implies that
Throughout the analysis, we use the Cournot model with homogenous products and linear demand to illustrate the results. In this benchmark case, we get the following result.
Example (Cournot Model with Linear Demand ). Suppose the two incumbents compete as
Cournot competitors with homogeneous product and constant marginal costs. Let the inverse demand function be P = 1 − Q, where Q = q A + q B . It holds that
and the optimal cross-licensing rate satisfies
For simplicity, we have assumed that each firm only needs its own IP to produce in its captive market. Our result above would not change even if they need each other's IP for captive markets as long as they can set different royalty rates across markets. They would agree to set zero royalty fees for each other's captive market to eliminate any distortion associated with positive rates whereas they would set r m in the common market. If they cannot set different royalty rates and are constrained to set the same royalty rate across markets, the optimal royalty rate depends on the relative size of the captive market vis-a-vis the common market with r * (s) decreasing in s with lim s→0 r * (s) → r m and lim s→∞ r * (s) → 0.
Cross-licensing when cost of entrant is known
Suppose that there is a potential entrant with marginal production cost γ who can enter one of the two captive markets. By assuming negligible litigation costs, we can define two threshold values of γ, γ and γ, where γ > γ :
Potentially, there can be three types of entrants. Entrants whose cost is sufficiently low (γ ≤ γ) will enter the market regardless patent litigation by the incumbent. Entrants whose cost is sufficiently high (γ > γ) will never enter the market because their expected profit never justifies their entry cost of K. For the entrants whose cost is intermediate ( 
With probability θ, firm A prevails in court, imposes an injunction against the entrant and maintains its monopolistic position in market A. However, with probability (1 − θ), its patent is invalidated. In this case, the captive market becomes duopolistic with the entrant.
Moreover, profits in the common market C are affected in two ways. First, the incumbent cannot collect any royalty revenues from firm B because it does not have any valid IP.
In addition, it now faces a stronger competitor as the rival incumbent's marginal cost is reduced from c + r to c. This reduces firm A's profits in the common market further. 5 In contrast, if firm A does not litigate and accommodates entry, its payoff is
Thus, firm A litigates against the entrant if and only if Π
The LHS of inequality (1) is the incumbent's expected benefit of litigation against the entrant. With probability θ, the incumbent gains monopoly rather than duopoly profits in the captive market of size s. The RHS represents the potential loss of profits in the common market when initiating patent litigation against the entrant. With probability 1 − θ, the 5 After its patent is invalidated, firm A may have an option to try to invalidate firm B's patent not to pay royalty payments in the common market. However, this strategy runs the risk of its sales being enjoined in the common market if B's patent is validated. We assume that this risk is too large for A to challenge B's patent.
incumbent's patent is invalidated. In this case, it loses its license revenues from the rival incumbent and makes lower product market profits as it faces a more efficient competitor in the common market. Notice that the RHS is increasing in r for at least r ∈ [0, r m ]. The higher the cross-license fee, the more the incumbent stands to lose in the common market in terms of lost license revenues and lower product market profits due to facing a more efficient competitor. By contrast, for r = 0, the RHS is zero and there is no potential loss from litigating against the entrant.
Moreover, note that the RHS is independent of the entrant's marginal cost while the LHS is decreasing in γ. This implies that the more efficient the entrant is, the more incentives the incumbent has to exclude the rival from the market. In particular, let γ L (r) be the value of the entrant's cost such that condition (1) holds with equality. We get the following result.
Lemma 2. After entry, the incumbent litigates against the entrant if and only if
The incumbents gain more from litigating and excluding low-cost entrants. A higher crosslicensing royalty rate in the common market reduces the incumbent's incentives to litigate and accommodates more entry by the marginal, low-cost entrant.
For any entrant type γ, there are two possible cases. If γ ≤ γ L (r m ), the incumbents have an incentive to litigate against the entrant even if they set the fully collusive royalty rate in the common market. Entry is blocked for this type of entrant. By contrast, if γ > γ L (r m ), the incumbents do not have a credible threat to litigate against the entrant if the royalty rate is set at the fully collusive level. In this case, the incumbents have two choices. They can either set the cross-licensing rate at r m and accommodate entry or set the rate at the
Deterring an entrant of type γ in the captive market is optimal for the incumbents if and only if
When choosing the cross-licensing rate, the incumbents trade off collusion in the common market and entry deterrence in the captive market. The LHS is the potential benefit from entry deterrence in the captive market. This benefit is strictly positive and decreases in the marginal cost of the entrant γ. The RHS is the relative gain from colluding and accommodating entry in market C. A higher γ requires a lower limit cross-licenser to maintain litigation incentives. Hence, the RHS is zero at γ = γ L (r m ) and increasing for higher cost levels of the entrant. As a consequence, incumbents are better off deterring entrants less who are not too much more inefficient than γ L (r m ). We thus get the following result.
There exists a critical level of the entrant's cost γ * ≤ γ such that if and only if γ ≤ γ * , then the incumbent deters entry with a royalty rater < r m .
The proposition states that for intermediate values of the entrant's cost, the incumbents optimally deter entry by reducing their cross-licensing rate in the common market. For more efficient entrants, γ < γ L (r m ), the incumbents have an incentive to litigate at the fully collusive cross-license rate. For less efficient entrants, they accommodate entry as the required reduction in the cross-license fee to induce litigation makes deterrence too costly.
We illustrate this result further with our example.
Example (Cournot Model with Linear Demand, continued ). Consider the above example with θ = 1/2, s = 1, c = 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1/2]. 6 We then have
From (1), it can be easily verified that
It also follows from (2) that if γ 0.414, then the condition can be written aŝ
Otherwise, entry deterrence always dominates. These two conditions are illustrated in yields higher profits for the incumbents than accommodating entry. By contrast, for a very inefficient entrant with γ > 0.438, entry deterrence is not worthwhile as it requires a very low royalty rate to maintain litigation incentives in the common market. In addition, the profit loss in the captive market is minimal when the entrant is very inefficient. Thus, the optimal royalty rate reverts back to the fully collusive level of r m = 1/4, introducing a non-monotonicity in γ with a discrete upward jump.
Let us briefly discuss the optimal royalty rate from the perspective of second-best social welfare with all other decisions (i.e., entry, litigation, and pricing decisions) left to market participants. The social planner faces a similar trade-off between competition in the common market versus promotion of entry into the captive market. However, the incentives for the social planner with regard to entry are diametrically opposite to the incumbent firms.
As discussed, the incumbents choose a royalty rate to deter entry if the potential entrant's cost is low while they accommodate entry with r = r m when γ is high. For the social planner, in contrast, entry is more desirable when γ is low whereas entry is mostly inefficient business stealing when γ is high. This implies that the optimal second-best royalty rate for high values of γ would be the lowest royalty rate that would deter entry, which isr=γ L −1 (γ). If γ is very low and the incumbents have incentives to litigate against the entrant even with the collusive royalty rate r m , it is impossible to induce entry into the captive markets. Thus, the optimal royalty rate would be zero in order to promote competition in the common market. For intermediate value of γ for which the incumbents need to set a royalty rate ofr = γ L −1 (γ) to deter entry, the second-best socially optimal royalty rate can ber + ε = γ L −1 (γ) + ε, the lowest royalty rate that would eliminate the incumbents' incentives to litigate and induce entry. In such a case, the second-best socially optimal outcome in the common market would be essentially the same as the market equilibrium, but would induce entry in the captive markets.
In this section, we have assumed that the incumbents know the entrant's cost. As a result, the incumbents can tailor its cross-licensing royalty rate to make their litigation threat credible when they adopt the strategy of entry deterrence. Thus, a royalty-free cross licensing can take place as a knife-edge case in the current set-up. 7 In section 4, however, we show that a royalty-free contract can emerge as a generic case when the incumbents face an entrant with unknown costs.
Litigation Costs and Entry Deterrence
In our model, credible litigation threats can serve as an entry barrier. In order to focus on the endogenous cost of litigation in the form of lost licensing revenues, we have so far abstracted from any exogenous litigation costs. In this section, we explore the role of litigation costs on the credibility of litigation and entry incentives. In particular, we 7 However, we can think of other reasons that would favour royalty-free cross licensing arrangements. For instance, if the limit royalty rate is positive, but close to zero, they may prefer a royalty-free contract if there are administrative costs in enforcing the contract with a positive royalty rate such as monitoring each other's sales levels.
show that the incumbents' ability to set a royalty rate to maintain litigation incentives can generate a paradoxical result. An increase in litigation costs may benefit the incumbents by changing the equilibrium configuration from entry met with litigation to entry deterrence.
To explore such a possibility, consider a situation in which the entrant's cost is sufficiently low and entry cannot be deterred even when the incumbent responds with litigation in face of entry. In other words, consider a case where there is "slack" z E in the entry constraint and slack z L in the litigation constraint of the incumbents,
Let r D ∈ [0, r m ) be the royalty rate at which the incumbents are indifferent between entry deterrence and accommodation if entry can be deterred withr = r D , that is,
As the entry deterrence profits on the RHS are increasing inr, the incumbents prefer entry Suppose that z L > z E . Then, it is evident that an increase in litigation costs by ∆L ∈ (z E , z L ) can be beneficial to the incumbents as the incumbents still maintain credible litigation threats whereas the expected profit from entry becomes negative when entry is met with litigation for certain. What is interesting is that even if litigation costs increases more than z L or there is a more slack in the IC constraint for entry, i.e., z L < z E , an increase in litigation costs can still be beneficial. The reason is that the incumbents can adjust their cross-licensing royalty rate to relax the litigation IC constraint further. As the incumbents are willing to reduce its royalty rate down to r D , we can define an enlarged
We can thus conclude that if z L > z E , then an increase in litigation costs by ∆L ∈ (z E , z L )
can be beneficial to the incumbents.
Example. Consider our earlier example with θ = 1/2, s = 1,and c = γ = 0 and r m = 1/4.
We compare how equilibrium changes when the litigation costs increase from L to L , where
Thus, entry cannot be deterred because the expected profit for the entrant is positive even in the face of certain litigation. In this example, it can be shown that entry deterrence always dominates for allr, that is, r D = 0. Note that
This implies that if the litigation costs increase by
This result is in contrast to cases where the patent holder is a non-practicing entity, or both the patent holder and the alleged infringer are practicing entities already operating in the market. In such cases, an increase in litigation costs can only hurt the patent holder because the litigation incentive constraint is more difficult to satisfy with higher litigation costs (Choi and Gerlach, 2017) . This analysis thus reveals that the effects of litigation costs may differ depending on whether the infringing firm is already active in the market or a potential entrant.
Optimal Cross-Licensing with Cost Uncertainty
We often find that direct competitors engage in royalty-free cross-licensing contracts, sometimes called "IP for IP" arrangements, contrary to the prediction of economic theory (Shapiro, 2004) . In this section, we resolve this discrepancy by considering a situation in which the potential entrant's cost is unknown to the incumbents when they set the crosslicensing royalty rate. In this case, royalty-free cross-license arrangements can arise in an optimal cross-license contract between incumbents.
Suppose the potential entrant's marginal cost γ is drawn from a distribution function
To reduce the number of cases to consider and without sacrifice of any insights, we make the following parameter assumption:
This ensures that the highest cost entrant has an incentive to enter without any litigation threat whereas the lowest cost entrant will not enter if its entry is met with litigation.
When the incumbent firms set a royalty rate of r, they have ex post incentives to litigate against the entrant if and only if its cost is lower than the critical value γ L (r). In this case, the threat of litigation is credible and entry is deterred. If the entrant's cost is above γ L (r), the threat of litigation is not credible and entry is accommodated. Ex ante, the probability of entry deterrence is given by F (γ L (r)) whereas with the remaining probability entry occurs and is accommodated. The incumbents maximize their expected profits and set a cross-license fee of
which yields the following first order condition,
The first term is the marginal effect of the cross-license rate on collusion in the common market. The second term is the effect of a higher cross-license on the profits from the marginal entrant. Since dγ L (r)/dr < 0 by lemma 2, this term is negative. A higher r reduces ex post litigation incentives and allows entry leading to duopoly instead of monopoly profits in the captive market. Hence, incumbents trade off collusion incentives in the common market against probabilistic entry deterrence in the captive market. It is clear that the optimal cross-license rate always satisfies r * < r m . As the entry deterrence motive becomes more important, the optimal cross-licensing rates need to be reduced further. If the first order condition is negative for all r, a corner solution with r * = 0 obtains; the optimal licensing arrangement is royalty-free cross-licensing.
Example. As in the earlier example, assume that θ = 1/2, s = 1,and c = 0 with r m = 1/4.
It can be shown that given a cross-licensing royalty rate of r, the incumbents have incentives to litigate against the entrant if
Furthermore, let L = 14/225 0.0622 and assume that γ is uniformly distributed on
This implies that r = 0 is required to have incentives against all entrant types.
We further assume that K < 4/225, which ensures that the highest cost type entrant has incentives to enter the market if there is no litigation. Then, it can be verified that the optimal strategy for the incumbents is to set r * = 0 and deter all types of entrants.
Our analysis can thus shed light on the puzzling practice of royalty free cross-licensing arrangements between competing firms in the same industry. Such arrangements enhance incentives to litigate against any potential entrants and can be used as an entry deterrence mechanism.
In the analysis above we assume that an entrant's marginal cost is exogenously given and cannot be changed. However, we can imagine a situation in which the entrant engages in "Judo economics" (Gelman and Salop, 1983 ) and adopts a puppy dog strategy by entering the market with a deliberately inefficient technology to deter litigation. We show that our qualitative results are robust to this possibility. To account for this possibility, let us assume that an entrant endowed with a marginal cost of γ can enter the market with any cost higher than or equal to γ. If this is the case, given a cross-licensing royalty rate of r between the incumbents, any entrant whose marginal cost is below γ L (r) will enter the market with the technology of γ L (r) to eliminate incentives to litigate by the incumbents. As a result, the incumbent facing such an entrant has a profit of sπ d (c, γ L (r)) rather than monopoly profits sπ m (c) when γ < γ L (r). With such judo strategies, the incumbents solve
as the first-order condition. As we have ∂π d (c, γ)/∂γ > 0 and dγ L (r)/dr < 0 by Lemma 2,
we can again conclude that the optimal cross-licensing rate for the incumbents is less than the royalty rate that sustains a fully collusive outcome in the common market. With this Judo strategy, the incumbents are unable to deter entry. However, by lowering, the royalty rate r, the entrant needs to raise γ to avoid litigation which increases the incumbents' duopoly profits in the captive market.
Policy Implications for Patent Pools
Incumbent firms with IP can use per-unit royalty rates to trade off collusion motives against entry-deterrence. When they lack incentives to litigate against a new entrant with a fully collusive royalty rate, they need to sacrifice full collusion in the common market by setting a lower royalty rate. However, if they are able to write a licensing contract that stipulates continuation of royalty payments even for invalidated patents, they can achieve both goals firms. In such a scenario, it can be easily verified that the profits from litigation arẽ
The patent pool will license its patents to member firms with a royalty rate ofr * = r m to sustain full collusion in the common market, but still maintain a credible litigation threat against the potential entrant. Note that in such a scenario, it may backfire if the competition authority imposes a non-discriminatory licensing rule on the patent pool to allow the entrant to receive licenses and insulate the entrant from litigation threat. The reason is that the patent pool in the presence of such a rule may then set a royalty rate even higher than r m to discourage entry by raising the entrant's costs (Salop and Scheffman, 1983) . As a result, we may end up having monopoly outcomes in both the common and the captive markets.
As in Lerner and Tirole (2004) , requiring pool members to independently license their patents outside the pool can be used as a screening mechanism to prevent welfare-reducing patent pools in our set-up. Lerner and Tirole (2004) consider patent pools when patent owners are not downstream users and therefore not potential licensees. In such a setting, they show that independent licensing by pool members creates competition and undermines patent pools that would elevate prices with substitute patents. In contrast to Lerner and Tirole (2004), we consider vertically integrated firms that are potential licensees. In our set-up, independent licensing implies that each patent holder can use its own technology for free. Thus, when the other firm's patent is invalidated, there is no need to license from the patent pool any more. Thus, we restore the endogenous cost of litigation as in the case of cross-licensing. As a result, the patent pool needs to reduce its royalty rate to restore incentives to litigate against the entrant.
an oligopolistic industry and show that underinvestment in entry-deterrence never occurs in equilibrium. Waldman (1987) further shows that the same conclusion obtains in the presence of uncertainty. In these models, the incumbents make an ex ante decision concerning entry deterrence before the potential entrant makes an entry decision. In our model, we consider a situation in which the incumbents make an ex ante strategic decision which changes the incentives to litigate ex post entry.
Consider the following framework. The two incumbents only operate in the common market C, that is, s = 0. There is a potential entrant in this market who might infringe on the intellectual property of the two incumbents in the same way as in the previous sections.
If the entrant's technology is found infringing on a valid patent, the entrant is unable to compete in the market. This means that successful exclusion requires exactly one incumbent to win infringement litigation. To shorten exposition, we again focus on the endogenous cost of litigation in the form of patent invalidation and assume that any other litigation related costs are negligible relative to the expected profits in the marketplace (L = 0).
Further suppose that the incumbents and the potential entrant produce at the same marginal cost of production of c = γ = 0. Let q t (a, b) and π t (a, b) be an incumbent's market quantity and profit in a triopoly when it pays royalty fees of a while the rival incumbent pays b. Similarly, the entrant's quantity and profits are given by q t e (a, b) and π t e (a, b). Moreover, let Π t (a, b) be the total profit of an incumbent inclusive of licensing revenues when it pays royalty a to its rival incumbent and receives a royalty b from that same firm. Again assume that all market quantities and profits decrease in a firm's own cost and increase in the cost level of the competitor.
Point (ii) makes sure that both incumbents' cost levels enter symmetrically into the entrant's quantity and profit. The last point states that the joint profits of the incumbents in a triopoly decrease in any license fee. This assumption holds, for example, if competition is in quantities and strategic substitutes. 9 We consider the following timing of the game:
1. Incumbents jointly set the cross-licensing rate r ≥ 0.
2. Entrant decides whether to enter at a sunk cost of K.
3. When there is entry, the incumbents simultaneously choose whether to litigate or not.
4. If the incumbent wins the infringement litigation, the duopoly persists. Otherwise the incumbents can renegotiate the cross-licensing fee and firms compete in a triopoly.
This set-up reflects a situation with a continuous threat of entry for the duopoly. The incumbents commit to a cross-licensing rate as long as they are able to exclude other competitors. If an entrant is able to establish itself in the market, either due to the absence of a litigation challenge or due to a win in court, the incumbents renegotiate their crosslicense arrangement and accommodate entry.
When there is entry into the common market, the incumbents simultaneously decide whether or not to initiate legal action against the entrant, l i ∈ {L, N }. Let Π xy denote an incumbent's expected profits when it picks x ∈ {L, N } while the other incumbent chooses y ∈ {L, N }. For simplicity we assume that if both initiate legal action, one of the two incumbents is randomly drawn to litigate against the entrant. 10 This assumption also reflects the war of attrition nature of the entry deterrence free-riding problem. Given the rival incumbent takes the case to court, an individual incumbent has a strict incentive to wait for the litigation outcome. Moreover, if after initiating, an incumbent decides not to act on its threat, its inaction may be interpreted as a tacit withdrawal of the patent claims. 9 We make this assumption for analytical simplicity. If competition is in prices and strategic complements, higher prices by the incumbents with a positive royalty could invite a higher price from the entrant. In this case, positive royalty fees may increase the incumbents' joint profits (see Deneckere and Davidson (1985) for a discussion in the context of mergers). While this would add an effect on the incumbents' ex ante profits, it would not interfere with the free-rider problem of patent litigation and the qualitative results of this section.
This can imply that the patent holder is barred to bring an infringement suit later on based on equitable estoppel. 11 We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. Note that, from a joint perspective, each incumbent can gain as much as
from a successful exclusion of the entrant. This benefit is strictly positive and increasing in the cross-licensing fee r. We make the following assumption on the above profit functions:
Assumption 3. For all r ≤ r m it holds that
The elasticity of the gain from free-riding with respect to the cross-licensing fee is higher than the elasticity of the overall benefit. In other words, the gains from free-riding are more responsive to the cross-license fee than the incumbents' collusive duopoly profits. This seems natural and holds, among others, in our leading example with Cournot competition and linear demand.
We can thus write the ex post payoffs for the incumbents as
Successful litigation increases both incumbents' profits by the difference between duopoly and triopoly profits, that is, B(r). At the same time, litigation is costly as the litigating incumbent stands a chance of losing and having its patent invalidated. In this case, the losing incumbent pays ∆(r)/2 to the rival incumbent in exchange for a zero-fee cross-license in a triopoly.
Now consider the litigation initiation subgame after entry. We focus on the symmetric, mixed-strategy equilibrium of this game. 12 Let λ be the probability that a given incumbent initiates legal action. In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the expected payoff from litigation has to be equal to the expected payoff from waiting, that is,
The first expression states that the litigation probability for an individual incumbent is given by the ratio of private gains over the average joint benefit from litigation. The second 12 There also exist two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria, one for each incumbent litigating. We find the symmetric, mixed-strategy equilibrium a better representation of the war of attrition aspect of the free-riding problem in entry deterrence. Using public randomization over the two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria would yield similar qualitative results in stages 1 and 2 of the game.
expression describes the probability of initiating litigation as a function of ∆(r) and B(r).
What is the effect of the cross-licensing fee r on litigation incentives? First note that in the absence of a free-rider problem, that is, for ∆(r = 0) = 0, litigation always occurs with probability 1. Higher cross-licensing fees increase the gains from free-riding ∆(r) which lowers the probability of litigating. At the same time, more collusive fees increase the potential reward from preventing entry B(r). However, the first effect dominates and we get the following result.
Lemma 3. For all r < r m , it holds that dλ(r)/dr < 0.
The proof of this lemma is can be found in the Appendix. Like in the benchmark model, cross-licensing arrangements have the potential to dull litigation incentives of incumbents.
In this set-up, cross-licensing exacerbates the free-rider problem in litigating against an entrant in the common market. Note that the incumbent's individual litigation probability implies an overall litigation probability of Λ(r) = 1−(1−λ(r)) 2 ≥ λ(r) which also decreases in r and increases in θ. Intuitively, the probability of litigation increases in the perceived strength of the patent case θ.
At stage 2, the entrant decides whether to enter or not, anticipating the litigation behavior of the incumbents. To make the analysis meaningful, we restrict ourselves to situations where entry is profitable without litigation but could be deterred with a credible threat of litigation, that is,
The entrant prefers to enter the marketplace and sink the cost if and only if
A higher cross-license royalty rate reduces the threat of litigation and increases the entrant's expected profits. Vice versa, at r=0, post-entry litigation occurs with probability one and entry is always deterred. Let us definer as the maximum royalty that deters entry from the competitor. For higher values of r, the entrant invests the cost K and then faces potential litigation that could exclude the firm from the marketplace. In other words, the incumbents can either use the mere threat of litigation to prevent entry or exclude firms in case they win litigation following entry. Note that a higher θ raises the probability of litigation and the entrant's chance of losing in court. This implies that the limit royalty feer increases in the strength of the incumbents' patent case θ. 13 Now consider the choice of the ex ante optimal cross-licensing arrangement at stage 1.
The maximum profit an incumbent can earn without inducing entry is given by a collusive cross-license arrangement at the limit entry fee, that is, Π C (r). For higher values, r >r, the entrant incurs the entry cost and faces litigation with probability Λ(r). In this case the optimal royalty rate for the incumbents solves
The first-order condition for an interior solution is given by
Ex post, the cross-license rate only matters in case the incumbent wins litigation. Hence, the success rate θ cancels out. The first term in condition (5) is the marginal potential gain in collusive cross-license profits in a duopoly weighted with the probability that litigation takes place. The second term is the marginal potential loss from reducing the litigation intensity by increasing the royalty rate r. It follows straight that marginal profits are always smaller than dΠ C (r)/dr for any r < r m . Thus, any interior solution -if it exists -has to satisfy r ∈ (r, r m ).
The incumbents prefer complete entry deterrence over accommodation and litigation if and only if
It is clear that there must exist parameter values such that entry deterrence is optimal for the incumbents. As the incumbents' patent case θ becomes weaker, the threat of litigation goes down and the RHS of condition (6) approaches triopoly profits. This must be dominated by entry deterrence as the LHS yields at least (royalty-free) duopoly profits. Vice versa, there are also situations where entry accommodation and litigation is optimal. As θ increases towards 1, the probability of litigation goes towards 1 and r gets closer to r m . Hence, the RHS approaches the fully collusive duopoly profits. Since Π C (r) is increasing for r ≤ r m , the interior solution r must yield higher profits than Π C (r). We can summarize as follows.
Proposition 2. When incumbents face entry in a common market, the optimal crosslicensing fee r * satisfies 0 ≤ r * < r m . If the incumbents' patent protection is weak, the optimal cross-licensing arrangement induces complete entry deterrence. Otherwise, entry occurs and the incumbents try to exclude the competitor through patent litigation.
Like in the model with entry in the captive markets, we find that the optimal cross-license fee is bounded away from the fully collusive fee r m . With entry in the common market, reducing the cross-license fee alleviates the free-rider problem of post-entry litigation. To which extent the cross-license is reduced depends on whether it is optimal to deter entry completely or allow entry followed by some litigation. The former strategy implies a low fee Finally, consumers are again stuck between two evils, collusive cross-licensing fees and entry deterrence. For a given cross-license rate, consumer are better off in a triopoly and they strictly prefer entry and less litigation. However, higher cross-licensing rates induce entry and lower the probability of litigation and possible exclusion of the entrant due to patent infringement. Are consumers better off with lower or higher cross-license rates? The answer depends on the strength of the incumbents' patent case. For example, suppose the incumbents' patent protection is weak and the optimal cross-license rate is the limit entry licenser. It follows straight from the above analysis that, in this case, a per se prohibition of positive cross-licensing rates would improve consumer surplus. By contrast, note that at r =r, consumer surplus has a discrete jump upwards as the expected surplus with entry and a potential triopoly always dominates entry deterrence. This implies that cross-license rate that maximizes consumer surplus can be strictly positive. This is, in particular, more likely ifr is sufficiently small or K close to the entrant's profits with certain litigation.
Conclusions
Antitrust authorities acknowledge the procompetitive effects of cross-licensing as a solution to hold-up problems in "navigating the patent thicket" (Shapiro, 2000) . At the same time, there are also concerns that cross-licensing and pooling arrangement may harm competition as they facilitate collusion through elevated royalty rates and reduced inter-technology competition by raising barriers to entry. We present an analytical framework that addresses both of these concerns and explores their interaction.
We consider optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. Cross-licensing allows the firms to clear blocking positions as the incumbents would infringe on each other's IP in the absence of an arrangement. However, the terms of the cross-licensing agreement also affect the incentives to litigate entrants infringing on the incumbents' patents. An incumbent litigating against an entrant faces the risk of having its patents invalidated by a court. We show that this leads to a trade-off for incumbents between setting collusive license fees and deterring entry by maintaining a credible litigation threat against new competitors. In this framework, a cross-licensing arrangement with a very low royalty rate (or even a royalty-free contract) may not be as benign as it appears if it is used as an entry deterrence mechanism. Hence, as in Jeon and Lefouili (forthcoming), our analysis provides some caution against simplistic rules regarding cross-licenses. 14 In fact, the presence of potential entry adds another layer of subtlety to 14 In particular, their analysis does not support the policy of granting a safe harbor to cross-licensing agreements between competitors based on their joint market share. Both the European Commission and US DOJ/FTC grant antitrust exemption to cross-licensing agreements if their joint market share is below 20%.
